

SP 35  
Folder 6b NATO

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18 September 1961 [REDACTED]

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. At the five o'clock meeting this evening, we will receive the State-Defense-Treasury replies to the ten questions which you posed with regard to the immediate call-up of four National Guard divisions, and the possible shipment of six additional divisions and support to Europe about the first of next year. It is my understanding that the recommendation will be to call up the four Guard divisions now and shortly to deploy to Europe one division of the present STAC.

2. The justification for this recommendation will be found in the reply to the ten questions. The argument runs that further mobilization and deployments should be taken at this time to convey to the USSR and NATO our determination to defend our interest in Berlin with the ultimate objective of increasing NATO defensive capability.

[REDACTED] This defensive requirement is represented by the 32-division goal which we have set for ourselves and our Allies for the end of 1961. If events turn out that this increase is not needed in Europe, it will be needed to increase over-all readiness to deal with other trouble spots such as Iran and Southeast Asia.

3. The Secretary of Defense appears to be confident of coping with the logistical problems and the requirement of more conventional air support arising from any substantial increase in U.S. division strength in Europe. He estimates that the four National Guard divisions can be completely converted to Active Army divisions in 6-12 months, the exact time depending on the availability of trained replacements and the degree of combat readiness maintained during conversion. However, he is not ready at this time to recommend converting these divisions at once if they are called up.

4. The answer to your query whether an increase of U.S. divisions in Europe may not trigger a similar or larger reinforcement in East Germany on the part of the Russians is yes, but it is pointed out that the Soviets may do so anyway.

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3. General Horsted's views have just been obtained by cable, and diverge from the foregoing on several points. He is against deployments at this time, but endorses the planned troop augmentation in Europe and the four division call up. Mr. McNamee will cover Horsted's views at the meeting.

4. In the course of the discussion this afternoon, you may wish to develop some of the following points:

a. To what increases are our NATO Allies firmly committed? If we put up six more divisions for Europe, what are the chances of reaching the 12-division level in the next few months? What further padding is necessary, and by whom?

b. If we send six divisions to Europe, should we announce a time limit for the duration of the increase?

c. What other actions should be considered to impress the USSR with our seriousness on Berlin - Defense National Emergency? Increase munitions production. More air defense at home and in Europe? Call up more cargo shipping? Announce or look plans for the withdrawal of dependents? More Civil Defense activity?

d. What other decisions are necessary now to get on with the Defense program presented on September 7? (For example, the initiation of production of KIEK/ZIEK, the conversion of the Guard divisions to Army of the United States; the deployment of mother carrier, to the Mediterranean.)

Memorandum for [redacted]

Re: [redacted]